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Chapter 3 - Deindustrializing the US: The War Against American Workers 1 
America’s state capitalist managers are mobilized to fight a war on two fronts. The first war 
is fought for hegemony over new populations as in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The 
second war is fought against Americans who work for a living, where the main instrument is 
the process of closing down American factories and allied workplaces. This second war is 
fought by economic measures of every sort. Compare the wages of American workers with 
those of states like China, whose governments are committed to prevent the creation of free 
trade unions. The wage differential between American and Chinese based production is now 
approximately 49 to 1. This differential also obtains for clerical, sales, administrative and 
other white-collar workers of all grades. The rush to enrich has seized American managers 
who are now schooled to ignore the consequence of lost livelihood in whole communities, 
and lost production capacity of whole industries. The rules for the war against American 
employees—white or blue collar—do not admit of any statement of limits. 
 
Until the middle of the 20th century, the managers and engineers of U.S. 
industry were probably the world’s best organizers of industrial work—
that was the root of their firm’s profits and the basis for their claim to 
large personal incomes. By the close of the 20th century the corps of U.S. 
managers had been modified by a major infusion of financial ideology. 
Money was increasingly to be “made” by market manipulation. Production 
was treated as old fashioned, a function that could be left to the 
underclasses of the Third World. This idea gained acceptance despite the 
fact that history contains no recent record of a nation being continuously 
supplied with goods from the “outside” and producing none in return. But 
America’s economists are not asked to explain such matters. Therefore, 
the great wave of U.S. management decisions to move production out of 
the U.S. has been virtually unchallenged.  
The decision power and personal wealth accorded to managers was one 
side of a historic social contract. In return for these privileges management 
was expected, by working people and community, to organize work. That 
social contract was threatened by the Great Depression and was 
reconstituted as a legitimation for management only when a new 
contingent of state managers was introduced to share in decision power 
over the industrial economy. Thereafter, management’s economists, 
informed by the theories of John Maynard Keynes, hoped that a new 
“public sector” military economy could help to restore industrial 
employment and stabilize the functioning of management’s decision 
processes, extending to the “private sector” as well.  
But the focused pursuit of profits and power by both private and state 
managers, acting in combination, also resulted in a major unanticipated 
effect. A process of technological and economic depletion of the means of 
production themselves was set in motion through the 20th century, causing 
major contraction of opportunities for productive livelihood.2 
 
I approached this problem in my study, Profits Without Production, from which I draw some 
helpful framing comments for understanding the ongoing process of deindustrialization. Sad 
to say, this war on American workers proceeds unabated. Since the mid-1960s the 
production competence of U.S. manufacturing has been deteriorating. By 2001, 61 percent 
of the new cars sold in the U.S. were being supplied from abroad, and 63 percent of the new 
metal-cutting machine tools, 65 percent of computers and peripherals, and 87 percent of 
audio and video equipment were no longer produced by American workers in American 
factories. Now, a visit to almost any hi-fi or electronics store in an American city will 
confirm that only a minor part of the sophisticated products offered for sale are made in the 
United States.  
Power tools, handheld and table mounted, for example, are an important class of 
equipment due to their key functions in the construction trades, as well as in home 
workshops. A 2003 visit to the tool section at a Home Depot store in New York City 
showed that 77 percent of all electric power tools were imported, most frequently from 
China, Taiwan and Mexico. (The American made power tools were professional, “contractor 
grade” tools, which were significantly more expensive than those targeting the home user 
market.) The domestic production of these and many other capital and consumer goods has 
been replaced, increasingly, by products from Western Europe, Japan and most recently 
China and other parts of Asia. 
  
Percent Of U.S. Market Supplied By Imports 
During 20013  
Machine Tools (Metal Cutting)  63% 
Machine Tools (Metal Forming)  88% 
Automobiles  61% 
Iron and Steel  23% 
Farm Machinery and Equipment  27% 
Construction Machinery  38% 
Mining Machinery and Equipment  30% 
Oil and Gas Field Machinery and 
Equipment  
28% 
Textile Machinery  71% 
Semiconductor Factory Machinery  32% 
Office Machines 62% 
Computers and Peripherals 65% 
Broadcasting and Wireless Equipment  33% 
Audio and Video Equipment  87% 
Semiconductors and Related Devices  54% 
Electromedical Apparatus  32% 
Apparel  57% 
Leather Goods 78% 
 
This collapse in production competence occurred just as the moneymaking successes of U.S. 
managers reached new highs.  
By 1983 I was moved to write about this in my book titled Profits Without Production, 
(Alfred A. Knopf), which essentially anticipated the late 20th century gyrations of the Enrons, 
and the wholesale deceptions and frauds perpetrated by the financial institutions on the 
hapless millions who turned over their savings to the custody of “mutual funds”. An 
excellent portrait of this management style is afforded by the autobiography by Jack Welch, 
Jack, Straight From the Gut, (Warner Business Books, 2001.) A careful critical assessment of 
both the firm and General Electric’s former chief was produced by Thomas F. O’Boyle, At 
Any Cost, Jack Welch, General Electric and the Pursuit of Profit, (Alfred A. Knopf, 1998). In Profits 
Without Production I detailed the change which had taken place: 
 
Even the most confirmed critics of capitalism had accepted the assessment 
of the productivity of industrial capitalism made by Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto (1848): 
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created 
more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding 
generations together. Subjection of nature’s forces to man, machinery, 
application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, 
railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, 
canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—
what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces 
slumbered in the lap of social labour?  
Most economists had once agreed that businessmen act as organizers of 
production, and differed sharply with the Marxists on the subject of 
distribution, seeing profit not as exploitation but as just return for services 
rendered.*  
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the pattern of industrial 
capitalism shifted. Soon after World War II the marketing executive 
emerged as the bright star of the American managerial firmament. 
“Madison Avenue” took center stage. The ideal type, as portrayed in 
management journals, had become the financier-strategist, the shrewd, 
nimble operator who combined disparate firms into conglomerates that 
maximized the short-term profit-taking opportunities afforded by tax laws, 
securities transfers, the milking of production assets and other financial 
legerdemain. This is a world of moneymaking, one that can prosper 
financially even as production is neglected or transferred to distant lands. 
In this world, the optimum condition is profit without any production. 4 
[Note that these forms of moneymaking later reached a frenzy during the 
1990’s internet bubble.] 
The historic crises of American capitalism—those revealing the functional 
incapacities of the system—were typically crises of decision-making, of the 
interior mechanism of the business process, while the production plant was 
fully competent to serve the market. The new and unprecedented 
development in American capitalism is the collapse of production 
competence in the manufacturing process itself.5 
 
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION GOES UNNOTICED 
If, as I pointed out in my earlier study, this collapse of production has been 
underway for decades, how is it that this disastrous process has gone largely 
unchallenged? Again, it is worth reminding ourselves of the cover stories which 
                                                
* An exemplary diagnosis of the businessmen of that era is in Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business 
Enterprise (Viking Press, 1946). 
 
have masked full understanding of the realities of deindustrialization. Chief among 
them is the post-war myth of a post-industrial society. In fact deterioration in the 
production competence of U.S. industries had been well under way since 1960 and 
was reported in some detail by 1965.6 But these early warnings of industrial 
inefficiency were received with skepticism by a population and government that 
was still aglow with the euphoria of World War II, that still believed the United 
States could enjoy both guns and butter, that had just been marshaled for the 
conquest of space and the first landing of man on the moon.  
In 1960, the air was full of Kennedy’s election campaign waged against a missile 
gap. Then came the Bay of Pigs debacle, defense against nuclear attack by means of 
“fallout shelters”, the Berlin Wall crisis, the Cuban Missile crisis, the trauma of 
Kennedy’s assassination, and the election of Lyndon Johnson—the pro-peace 
candidate who operated a small war on poverty and a large war in Vietnam.  
All this while the universities were awash in money, as the government, with cheers from 
the populace, demanded more science, more technology, more trained professionals to 
guarantee U.S. leadership in the space race and the arms race too. In the midst of such 
excitements, almost no one paid much attention to the closing of factories in a widening 
sweep of Northeastern and Midwestern cities. 
The American intelligentsia were seized with dreams of a post-industrial society—so why 
not hand over mundane production to the Japanese and Chinese while the United States 
concentrated on high technology?7 Against such a background of ideological reassurance, (or 
was it nationalist arrogance?) few were prepared to consider the full significance of many 
ongoing events. So the World Trade Center in New York City had a steel framework that 
was made in Japan—well, after all, the U.S. construction industry has long been backward. 
So the Alaska pipeline was made in Japan—well, the Japanese steel industry profited from its 
technical renewal, having been destroyed by U.S. bombardments during World War II. So 
the shoe factories of New England are closing and their machinery and tools are sold 
abroad—well, in the post-industrial society, Americans should be concerned with high 
technology and not with demeaning work like shoemaking that can well be done in less 
developed countries.  
So the closing of enterprises in the United States during the decades leading to 2000 
disrupted the lives of millions—well, let the labor market handle the problem of placing 
those people back into the U.S. economy. 8 
There have been important barriers to seeing, and therefore believing, that the United 
States has been losing its productive vitality. The decline is felt by working people, 
technicians, and their immediate communities, who have lost their livelihoods and often 
been forced into a gypsy-like existence in the quest for jobs. The effect on young people, as 
candidates for entry-level industrial jobs, is particularly hurtful.* The rest of the town feels at 
second hand the effects of lost industrial jobs—by the appearance of a Lumpenproletariat, that 
                                                
* One effect of the deindustrialization process has been to create unemployment. Higher 
unemployment however has been significantly concentrated among black workers, largely due to 
racism entrenched in U.S. society. This shunting of unemployment to black workers has also resulted 
in some degree of sheltering white workers from unemployment, and thereby obscured the 
understanding of deindustrialization in mainstream America.  
 
is, a permanently unemployed, or underemployed welfare-dependent population, and by the 
decline of municipal facilities and services of every sort. 
Still an important part of American society has been substantially shielded from these 
effects. This is the suburban middle class, which is concentrated in occupations that are not 
related to manufacture. For these people deterioration in the United States’ producing 
capability is hardly visible. Well-made durable goods are available from local dealers, and in 
middle-class suburbia public amenities are often first-rate. Americans are simply unaware or 
have been unwilling to confront a new, culturally astonishing fact: the United States is well 
on the way to becoming a third-rate industrial country.9 
Now in the 21st Century the idea of “going offshore” is widely appreciated in 
management circles. Taking advantage of low-wage labor and virtual government guarantees 
of no unionization, (as in China and Mexico) has been a highly attractive lure to many 
managements. A repeated pattern has involved moving production operations abroad, (with 
either American managers or with production by foreign contractors) while retaining U.S.-
based top management and marketing operations. Lou Dobbs, a CNN network newscaster 
has tracked the firms engaged in “Exporting America”. As of June 25th, 2004 his list includes 
807 such American firms that are either “sending American jobs overseas, or choosing to 
employ cheap overseas labor, instead of American workers”.10 
 
807 U.S. FIRMS “OUTSOURCE” AMERICAN JOBS 
Aalfs Manufacturing 
Aavid Thermal Technologies 
ABC-NACO 
Accenture  
Access Electronics  
Accuride Corporation 
Accuride International 
Adaptec 
ADC 
Adobe Air 
Adobe Systems 
Advanced Energy Industries 
Aei Acquisitions 
Aetna 
Affiliated Computer Services 
AFS Technologies  
A.G. Edwards  
Agere Systems 
Agilent Technologies 
AIG 
Alamo Rent A Car 
Albany International Corp. 
Albertson’s 
Alcoa 
Alcoa Fujikura 
Allen Systems Group 
Alliance Semiconductor 
Allstate  
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Alpha Thought Global 
Altria Group 
Amazon.com 
AMD 
Americ Disc 
American Dawn  
American Express  
American Greetings  
American Household  
American Management Systems 
American Standard 
American Tool 
American Uniform Company 
AMETEK 
AMI DODUCO  
Amloid Corporation 
Amphenol Corporation 
Analog Devices  
Anchor Glass Container 
ANDA Networks 
Anderson Electrical Products  
Andrew Corporation 
Anheuser-Busch 
Angelica Corporation 
Ansell Health Care 
Ansell Protective Products 
Anvil Knitwear 
AOL 
A.O. Smith  
Apple 
Applied Materials 
Arkansas General Industries 
Ark-Les Corporation 
Arlee Home Fashions 
Art Leather Manufacturing 
Artex International 
ArvinMeritor 
Asco Power Technologies  
Ashland 
AstenJohnson 
Asyst Technologies 
Atchison Products, Inc. 
A.T. Cross Company 
AT&T 
AT&T Wireless 
A.T. Kearney 
Augusta Sportswear 
Authentic Fitness Corporation 
Automatic Data Processing  
Avanade 
Avanex 
Avaya  
Avery Dennison 
Azima Healthcare Services  
Axiohm Transaction Solutions  
Bank of America  
Bank of New York 
Bank One 
Bard Access Systems  
Barnes Group 
Barth & Dreyfuss of California 
Bassett Furniture 
Bassler Electric Company 
BBi Enterprises L.P. 
Beacon Blankets 
BearingPoint 
Bear Stearns 
BEA Systems 
Bechtel 
Becton Dickinson 
BellSouth 
Bentley Systems 
Berdon LLP 
Berne Apparel 
Bernhardt Furniture 
Besler Electric Company 
Best Buy 
Bestt Liebco Corporation  
Beverly Enterprises 
Birdair, Inc.  
BISSELL  
Black & Decker 
Blauer Manufacturing 
Blue Cast Denim 
Bobs Candies 
Borden Chemical 
Bourns 
Bose Corporation 
Bowater 
BMC Software 
Boeing 
Braden Manufacturing 
Briggs Industries 
Brady Corporation 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Bristol Tank & Welding Co. 
Brocade 
Brooks Automation  
Brown Wooten Mills Inc. 
Buck Forkardt, Inc. 
Bumble Bee 
Burle Industries 
Burlington House Home Fashions 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway  
C&D Technologies 
Cadence Design Systems 
Camfil Farr 
Candle Corporation  
Cains Pickles 
Capital One 
Capital Mercury Apparel 
Cardinal Brands 
Carrier  
Carter’s 
Caterpillar 
C-COR.net 
Cellpoint Systems 
Cendant 
Centis, Inc. 
Cerner Corporation 
Charles Schwab 
ChevronTexaco 
The Cherry Corporation  
CIBER 
Ciena 
Cigna 
Circuit City 
Cirrus Logic 
Cisco Systems 
Citigroup  
Clear Pine Mouldings 
Clorox 
CNA  
Coastcast Corp. 
Coca-Cola 
Cognizant Technology Solutions  
Collins & Aikman  
Collis, Inc. 
Columbia House 
Columbus McKinnon 
Comcast Holdings 
Comdial Corporation 
Computer Associates 
Computer Horizons  
Computer Sciences Corporation 
CompuServe 
Concise Fabricators 
Conectl Corporation 
Conseco 
Consolidated Metro 
Consolidated Ventura 
Continental Airlines 
Convergys 
Cooper Crouse-Hinds 
Cooper Tire & Rubber 
Cooper Tools 
Cooper Wiring Devices 
Copperweld  
Cordis Corporation  
Corning 
Corning Cable Systems 
Corning Frequency Control  
Countrywide Financial  
COVAD Communications 
Covansys 
Creo Americas 
Cross Creek Apparel 
Crouzet Corporation 
Crown Holdings 
CSX 
Cummins 
Cutler-Hammer 
Cypress Semiconductor  
Dana Corporation 
Daniel Woodhead 
Davis Wire Corp. 
Daws Manufacturing 
Dayton Superior 
DeCrane Aircraft 
Delco Remy 
Dell Computer 
DeLong Sportswear  
Delphi 
Delta Air Lines 
Delta Apparel 
Direct TV 
Discover  
DJ Orthopedics 
Document Sciences Corporation 
Dometic Corp. 
Donaldson Company  
Douglas Furniture of California 
Dow Chemical  
Dresser 
Dun & Bradstreet 
DuPont  
Earthlink 
Eastman Kodak 
Eaton Corporation 
Edco, Inc. 
Editorial America 
Edscha 
eFunds 
Ehlert Tool Company  
Elbeco Inc. 
Electro Technology 
Electroglas 
Electronic Data Systems 
Electronics for Imaging 
Eli Lilly  
Elmer’s Products 
E-Loan  
EMC 
Emerson Electric  
Emerson Power Transmission 
Emglo Products 
Engel Machinery 
En Pointe Technologies 
Equifax 
Ernst & Young 
Essilor of America 
Ethan Allen 
Evenflo 
Evergreen Wholesale Florist 
Evolving Systems 
Evy of California 
Expedia 
Extrasport 
ExxonMobil  
Fairfield Manufacturing 
Fair Isaac 
Fansteel Inc.  
Farley’s & Sathers Candy Co. 
Fasco Industries 
Fawn Industries 
FCI USA 
Fedders Corporation 
Federal Mogul  
Federated Department Stores 
Fellowes 
Fender Musical Instruments 
Fidelity Investments 
Financial Techologies International  
Findlay Industries  
First American Title Insurance 
First Data  
First Index  
Fisher Hamilton  
Flowserve 
Fluor  
FMC Corporation 
Fontaine International 
Ford Motor 
Foster Wheeler  
Franklin Mint 
Franklin Templeton 
Freeborders 
Frito Lay 
Fruit of the Loom  
Garan Manufacturing 
Gateway 
GE Capital 
GE Medical Systems 
Gemtron Corporation 
General Binding Corporation 
General Cable Corp. 
General Electric 
General Motors 
Generation 2 Worldwide 
Genesco 
Georgia-Pacific  
Gerber Childrenswear  
Global Power Equipment Grp.  
GlobespanVirata 
Goldman Sachs  
Gold Toe Brands  
Goodrich 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Google 
Graphic Controls 
Greenpoint Mortgage 
Greenwood Mills 
Grote Industries 
Grove U.S. LLC 
Guardian Life Insurance 
Guilford Mills 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.  
Haggar 
Halliburton 
Hamilton Beach/Procter-Silex 
The Hartford Financial Services Group 
Harper-Wyman Company 
Hasbro Manufacturing Services 
Hawk Corporation  
Hawker Power Systems, Inc. 
Haworth 
Headstrong 
HealthAxis 
Hedstrom 
Hein-Werner Corp. 
Helen of Troy 
Helsapenn Inc.  
Hershey 
Hewitt Associates 
Hewlett-Packard  
Hoffman Enclosures, Inc. 
Hoffman/New Yorker 
The Holmes Group 
Home Depot 
Honeywell 
HSN  
Hubbell Inc.  
Humana 
Hunter Sadler 
Hutchinson Sealing Systems, Inc 
HyperTech Solutions  
IBM  
iGate Corporation 
Illinois Tool Works 
IMI Cornelius 
Imperial Home Decor Group  
Indiana Knitwear Corp. 
IndyMac Bancorp 
Infogain 
Ingersoll-Rand  
Innodata Isogen 
Innova Solutions 
Insilco Technologies 
Intel  
InterMetro Industries 
International Paper 
Interroll Corporation 
Intesys Technologies 
Intuit 
Invacare 
Iris Graphics, Inc. 
Isola Laminate Systems 
Iteris Holdings, Inc. 
ITT Educational Services 
ITT Industries  
Jabil Circuit 
Jacobs Engineering 
Jacuzzi 
Jakel, Inc. 
JanSport 
Jantzen Inc. 
JDS Uniphase 
Jockey International  
John Crane 
John Deere 
Johns Manville 
Johnson Controls 
Johnson & Johnson  
JPMorgan Chase 
J.R. Simplot  
Juniper Networks 
Justin Brands  
K2 Inc. 
KANA Software 
Kaiser Permanente 
Kanbay 
Kayby Mills of North Carolina 
Keane 
Kellogg 
Kellwood 
KEMET 
KEMET Electronics 
Kendall Healthcare 
Kenexa 
Kentucky Apparel 
Kerr-McGee Chemical 
KeyCorp  
Key Industries 
Key Safety Systems 
Key Tronic Corp. 
Kimberly-Clark 
KLA-Tencor 
Kojo Worldwide Corporation 
Knight Textile Corp. 
Kraft Foods 
Kulicke and Soffa Industries  
Kwikset  
Lake Village Industries 
Lancer Partnership 
Lander Company 
LaCrosse Footwear 
Lamb Technicon 
Lands’ End 
Lau Industries 
Lawson Software  
Layne Christensen 
Leach International 
Lear Corporation 
Leech Tool & Die Works 
Lehman Brothers 
Leoni Wiring Systems 
Levi Strauss 
Leviton Manufacturing Co. 
Lexmark International 
Lexstar Technologies 
Liebert Corporation 
Lifescan  
Lillian Vernon 
Linksys 
Linq Industrial Fabrics, Inc. 
Lionbridge Technologies 
Lionel 
Littelfuse 
LiveBridge 
LNP Engineering Plastics 
Lockheed Martin 
Longaberger 
Louisiana-Pacific Corporation 
Louisville Ladder Group LLC 
Lowe’s 
Lucent 
Lund International 
Lyall Alabama  
Madill Corporation 
Magma Design Automation 
Magnequench 
Magnetek 
Maidenform 
Mallinckrodt, Inc.  
The Manitowoc Company 
Manugistics 
Marathon Oil  
Marine Accessories Corp. 
Maritz 
Mars 
Marshall Fields  
Mattel 
Master Lock 
Materials Processing, Inc. 
Maxi Switch 
Maxim Integrated Products 
Maxxim Medical 
Maytag 
McDATA Corporation 
McKinsey & Company 
MeadWestvaco 
Mediacopy 
Medtronic 
Mellon Bank  
Mentor Graphics Corp. 
Meridian Automotive Systems 
Merit Abrasive Products 
Merrill Corporation 
Merrill Lynch 
Metasolv 
MetLife 
Micro Motion, Inc. 
Microsoft 
Midcom Inc. 
Midwest Electric Products  
Milacron 
Modern Plastics Technics 
Modine Manufacturing 
Moen 
Money’s Foods Us Inc. 
Monona Wire Corp. 
Monsanto  
Morgan Stanley 
Motion Control Industries 
Motor Coach Industries International 
Motorola 
Mrs. Allison’s Cookie Co. 
MTD Southwest 
Mulox  
Munro & Company  
Nabco 
Nabisco 
NACCO Industries 
National City Corporation 
National Electric Carbon Products 
National Life 
National Semiconductor  
NCR Corporation 
neoIT 
NETGEAR 
Network Associates 
Newell Rubbermaid 
Newell Window Furnishings 
New World Pasta  
New York Life Insurance 
Nice Ball Bearings  
Nike 
Nordstrom 
Northrop Grumman 
Northwest Airlines 
Nu Gro Technologies 
Nu-kote International 
NutraMax Products  
O’Bryan Brothers Inc. 
Ocwen Financial 
Office Depot 
Ogden Manufacturing 
Oglevee, Ltd 
Ohio Art  
Ohmite Manufacturing Co.  
Old Forge Lamp & Shade 
Omniglow Corporation 
ON Semiconductor 
Orbitz 
Oracle 
OshKosh B’Gosh 
Otis Elevator  
Outsource Partners International 
Owens-Brigam Medical Co. 
Owens Corning 
Oxford Automotive 
Oxford Industries  
Pacific Precision Metals 
Pak-Mor Manufacturing 
palmOne 
Parallax Power Components 
Paramount Apparel 
Parker-Hannifin  
Parsons E&C 
Paxar Corporation 
Pearson Digital Learning 
Peavey Electronics Corporation  
PeopleSoft  
PepsiCo 
Pericom Semiconductor 
PerkinElmer 
PerkinElmer Life Sciences, Inc. 
Perot Systems 
Pfaltzgraff 
Pfizer  
Phillips-Van Heusen 
Photronics 
Pinnacle Frames 
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation  
Pitney Bowes 
Plaid Clothing Company  
Planar Systems 
Plexus  
Pliant Corporation  
PL Industries 
Polaroid 
Polymer Sealing Solutions  
Portal Software 
Portex, Inc. 
Portola Packaging  
Port Townsend Paper Corp. 
Power One 
Pratt & Whitney 
Price Pfister 
priceline.com 
Pridecraft Enterprises 
Prime Tanning 
Primus Telecom 
Procter & Gamble  
Progress Lighting  
ProQuest 
Providian Financial 
Prudential Insurance  
Quaker Oats 
Quadion Corporation 
Quantegy 
Quark 
Qwest Communications 
Radio Flyer 
Radio Shack 
Rainbow Technologies 
Rawlings Sporting Goods 
Rayovac 
Raytheon Aircraft 
RBX Industries 
RCG Information Technology 
Red Kap 
Regal Rugs 
Regal-Beloit Corporation  
Regence Group 
Respiratory Support Products 
R.G. Barry Corp. 
Rich Products 
River Holding Corp.  
Robert Mitchell Co., Inc. 
Rockwell Automations 
Rockwell Collins 
Rogers 
Rohm & Haas 
Ropak Northwest 
RR Donnelley & Sons 
Rugged Sportswear 
Russell Corporation  
S1 Corporation 
S & B Engineers and Constructors 
Sabre 
Safeway 
SAIC 
Sallie Mae 
Samsonite 
Samuel-Whittar, Inc. 
Sanford 
Sanmina-SCI 
Sapient 
Sara Lee 
Saturn Electronics & Engineering 
SBC Communications 
Schumacher Electric 
Scientific Atlanta 
Seal Glove Manufacturing 
Seco Manufacturing Co. 
SEI Investments 
Sequa Corporation 
Seton Company 
Sheldahl Inc. 
Shipping Systems, Inc. 
Shugart Corp. 
Siebel Systems 
Sierra Atlantic 
Sights Denim Systems, Inc. 
Signal Transformer  
Signet Armorlite, Inc. 
Sikorsky 
Silicon Graphics  
Simula Automotive Safety 
SITEL 
Skyworks Solutions 
SMC Networks 
SML Labels 
SNC Manufacturing Company  
SoftBrands 
Sola Optical USA  
Solectron 
Sonoco Products Co.  
Southwire Company 
Sovereign Bancorp 
Spectrum Control  
Spicer Driveshaft Manufacturing 
Springs Industries 
Springs Window Fashions 
Sprint 
Sprint PCS 
SPX Corporation 
Square D 
Standard Textile Co.  
Stanley Furniture  
Stanley Works 
Stant Manufacturing 
Starkist Seafood 
State Farm Insurance 
State Street 
Steelcase 
StorageTek 
Store Kraft Manufacturing 
StrategicPoint Investment Advisors  
Strattec Security Corp. 
STS Apparel Corporation 
Summitville Tiles 
Sun Microsystems  
Sunrise Medical 
SuntronÊ 
SunTrust Banks 
Superior Uniform Group 
Supra Telecom 
Sure Fit 
SurePrep 
The Sutherland Group 
Sweetheart Cup Co. 
Swift Denim 
Sykes Enterprises 
Symbol Technologies 
Synopsys 
Synygy  
Takata Retraint Systems 
Target 
Teccor Electronics  
Techalloy Company, Inc. 
Technotrim 
Tecumseh 
Tee Jays Manufacturing 
Telcordia 
Telect 
Teleflex 
TeleTech 
Telex Communications 
Tellabs 
Tenneco Automotive 
Teradyne 
Texas Instruments 
Textron 
Thermal Industries 
Therm-O-Disc, Inc. 
Thomas & Betts 
Thomasville Furniture 
Thomas Saginaw Ball Screw Co. 
Three G’s Manufacturing Co.  
Thrivent Financial for Lutherans 
Time Warner 
Tingley Rubber Corp. 
The Timken Company 
Tomlinson Industries  
The Toro Company 
Torque-Traction Mfg. Tech. 
Tower Automotive 
Toys “R” Us  
Trailmobile Trailer 
Trans-Apparel Group 
TransPro, Inc. 
Trans Union  
Travelocity 
Trek Bicycle Corporation 
Trend Technologies 
TriMas Corp. 
Trinity Industries 
Triquint Semiconductor  
TriVision Partners  
Tropical Sportswear  
TRW Automotive 
Tumbleweed Communications 
Tupperware 
Tyco Electronics 
Tyco International  
UCAR Carbon Company 
Underwriters Laboratories 
UniFirst Corporation 
Union Pacific Railroad 
Unison Industries 
Unisys 
United Airlines 
UnitedHealth Group Inc. 
United Online 
United Plastics Group 
United States Ceramic Tile 
United Technologies 
Universal Lighting Technologies  
USAA 
Valence Technology  
Valeo Climate Control  
VA Software 
Velvac 
Veritas 
Verizon  
Vertiflex Products 
VF Corporation  
Viasystems 
Vishay 
Visteon 
VITAL Sourcing 
Wabash Alloys, L.L.C. 
Wabash Technologies 
Wachovia Bank 
Walgreens 
Walls Industries 
Warnaco 
Washington Group International 
Washington Mutual 
WebEx 
Weiser Lock 
WellChoice 
Wellman Thermal Systems 
Werner Co. 
West Corporation 
West Point Stevens 
Weavexx 
Weyerhaeuser  
Whirlpool 
White Rodgers 
Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Company 
Winpak Films  
Wolverine World Wide 
Woodstock Wire Works 
Woodstuff Manufacturing 
WorldCom 
World Kitchen 
Wyeth 
Wyman-Gordon Forgings  
Xerox 
Xpectra Incorporated 
Xpitax 
Yahoo! 
Yarway Corporation 
York International 
Zenith 
ZettaWorks 
(Source: CNN, Lou Dobbs Tonight “Exporting America” as of 6/25/04) 
 
Why have hundreds of American firms abandoned U.S. production – in whole or in part - in 
favor of relocating to China, Mexico or other similar locations? Largely responsible is the 
U.S. industrial managers’ reluctance to invest in production method Research and Development 
(R+D) for developing substantial increases in productivity and cost-reduction. Though such 
R&D is necessary for maintaining a firm’s long-term competitiveness, it is also expensive 
and carries an inherent risk of uncertain results. U.S. managers—who personally benefit 
from short-term increases in profits—have preferred instead to achieve cost-reductions and 
profit increases by the sure-fire method of hiring drastically cheaper labor—typically in 
foreign countries. This results in both a loss of American jobs, and a possible loss of 
expertise to other nations’ firms who are still willing to invest in production method R&D.  
It is unlikely that the processes can be reversed by any quick fix. Thus, asking the schools 
of business administration to give more attention to production can’t change the priorities of 
the present faculties, or the intellectual assumptions and cultural biases that guide those 
institutions. The low esteem in which production work is held by the managerial teaching 
centers of the United States, private and public, cannot be altered by admonitions that they 
mend their ways.  
 
OUTSOURCING VS. WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 
The widespread transfer of manufacturing from the United States is having an additional, 
and virtually undiscussed, consequence. It not only drastically undercuts workers’ ability –at 
home and abroad—to control their lives and seek fair and safe working conditions; 
outsourcing also has disastrous consequences for productivity and R+D. The factory has 
historically been a chief site for the formation of trade-unions. In forming unions, workers 
strive to define their relationships to one another, as well as their relationships with 
management. Through this process, workers gain more control over their working lives, 
including the details of their work performance. Effectively, workers thereby gain increasing 
voice in the operation of their factories. Making profitable use of new production methods-
especially those using capital-intensive computerized manufacturing equipment-requires a 
production labor force that is flexible, well educated and capable of exercising a range of 
independent decision-making. Thus developing and improving methods of a modern factory 
reinforces the workers own attempts to gain control over their working lives. 
The outsourcing phenomenon undercuts this development in two ways. First, the classic 
choice of location for the offshore factory is China-where the government actively 
suppresses the formation of independent unions. Similar conditions can be found in many 
other nations around the world. Secondly, access to dramatically lower-wage labor removes 
pressures on management to develop and implement higher-productivity equipment and 
techniques. Thereby, outsourcing relieves managements of responsibility for R&D costs that 
are required for developing and applying new technologies for raising the productivity of 
labor as well as capital.* 
 
PATTERNS OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION 
The opening of the 21st century has included accelerated deindustrialization of U.S. industry. 
We can now see a pattern of symptoms that accompany the removal of production work 
from the U.S. locale:  
 
v Industrial research and development for innovative products and production 
processes is avoided; 
v Top management of leading firms become increasingly finance- and short-
term-profit-oriented;  
v Investment in new equipment is deferred, and the age of manufacturing 
facilities increases;  
v Product variety within firms is enlarged and opportunities for standardization 
of components are avoided;  
v Maintenance of production equipment is deferred and product reliability 
declines;  
v Quality is controlled by defining acceptable percentages of defective 
products;  
v Work and workers are accorded low status, and therefore the organization of 
work is of secondary importance;  
v Technical initiatives by workers is resisted as diminishing the power and 
effectiveness of management; profits are maintained by seeking investment 
opportunities outside the original product sphere of the firm;  
v Production facilities are abandoned after systematic withholding of 
maintenance and equipment replacement;  
v Management seeks improvement in overall efficiency by intensifying 
administrative controls and supervision;  
v Wage rates are described as the prime cause of noncompetitiveness;  
v Opportunities for improving productivity of capital and labor through 
stabilization of operations are characteristically ignored, being mainly 
unknown to industry managers, while management attempts to pass along 
cost increases to customers. 11 
 
As I also noted in Profits Without Production: “When all else fails—and profits as well as 
management’s position are in peril—management turns to government for subsidy and 
rescue. Meanwhile, management seeks its self-justification in pronouncements about post-
industrial society, “sunset” industries and the like.”12 Managers of leading firms then seek 
                                                
* The subject of developments in workplace democracy has been dealt with at length in After 
Capitalism Parts IV&V, (Chapters 9,10,11,12). These sections include details on these processes in  
various unions, industries and firms. It is important to understand that these processes also apply to a 
host of white-collar occupations and industries as well. ] 
 
renewed viability for themselves by redefining their main function to marketing, leaving 
production to others. This process has been decades in the making. 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT STYLES: MAZDA AND CHRYSLER 
CONFRONT AUTO INDUSTRY CRISIS 
The consequences of major differences in managerial styles can be far-reaching. Given 
current anxieties about the spiraling costs of oil, and America’s addiction to gas guzzling 
SUVs, it is worth revisiting the strikingly different responses of Japanese and American auto 
manufacturers to an early oil crisis. Here is an illustration from the problems of the 
automobile industry. Japanese and American auto firms both experienced the “oil shock” of 
1973. It’s instructive to contrast the response in the number-three firm of each industry: 
Chrysler in the United States and Mazda in Japan. The Mazda management had invested 
heavily in the Wankel engine, an innovative mechanical design which also had high fuel 
consumption. Therefore, Mazda sales dropped sharply after 1973, changing hundred-
million-dollar profits into equal losses, while the firm also faced indebtedness of about a 
billion dollars. 
The Mazda management started a vigorous campaign to redesign product and production 
methods toward more fuel-efficient engines and the drastic mechanization of work 
(especially through installation of robots). The program was supported by financing from 
banks, with no help coming from government. At the same time, the management gave 
notice that the jobs of its workers were protected: attrition and early retirement would be the 
only methods used to reduce employment. During the period of major changeover and 
lowest production rate, management arranged for 5,000 of its workers to be deployed to 
Mazda dealers, working there as salesmen and maintenance men. There were pay cuts among 
managers at Mazda—the largest, 20 percent, among the senior managers—and elimination 
of bonuses for four years. Middle managers had their salaries and other income frozen. 
There were no reductions of pay or bonuses for factory workers. 
By 1981, Mazda’s indebtedness had been cut almost in half and the firm was profitable 
once again. Its labor productivity was almost doubled. More recently Mazda reported that its 
net profits had doubled in the first half of 2003, due to strong sales in Europe and Asia.13 
At Chrysler, the response to OPEC oil pricing did not really start seriously until 1979, 
when the company was on the verge of bankruptcy. Chrysler turned to the U.S. government 
to guarantee its future financing, and management discharged 28 percent of its workers and 
7 percent of white-collar employees. About two weeks before Chrysler management applied 
for federal loan guarantees, the top managers announced pay cuts for their levels of 2 to 10 
percent. Now in 2004, Chrysler is no longer an American firm, having been bought by the 
German firm Daimler. 
At Mazda the management extended to the work force an implicit understanding that 
they, production workers, have a major stake in the enterprise and that it is the obligation of 
management to make sure that that stake is protected. By contrast, the Chrysler management 
treated its production worker force as “commodities,” tossing the ones not needed for 
management’s plans onto “the market.” The Chrysler pattern contains the idea that 
management has a far greater stake in the firm than the production workers, and that the 
presence of management employees is of greater importance for the competence of the 
enterprise. Mazda policy was oriented toward conserving the work force as a prime 
productive asset. The effects of these contrasting policies are obvious enough. At Mazda, 
management was virtually assured of full support from the work force, including 
cooperation in the introduction and utilization of new technology. In the Chrysler case, that 
was hardly to be expected against the long background of management-union 
confrontationism.14 It remains to be seen if American car manufacturers can learn from their 
past mistakes. 
 
THE ROLE OF U.S. WAGES 
Americans witnessing the spectacle of industrial decline have typically responded with a 
barrage of “explanations.” The claim that “our high wages make us noncompetitive” is often 
issued first. 15 But history teaches us a different lesson. For two centuries, workshops, then 
manufacturing industries in the United States prospered while paying the highest wages in 
the world. This was notably so during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when 
there was no question about the ease of transporting industrial goods, even across oceans. 
Product design and productivity in manufacturing in the United States were fully adequate to 
offset the lower wage costs enjoyed by manufacturers in all the other industrialized 
countries. Therefore one must ask why U.S. design and production competence faltered 
even as American managements no longer had to overcome a wage cost handicap.16 
But U.S. industrial firms also have costs besides wages to production workers. Upper 
level managers in U.S. firms have arranged compensation for themselves and their closer 
associates that are unique in world capitalism. Here are summary data for 2000, on chief 
executive pay as a multiple of “employee average” in the U.S. and seven other economies. 
  
Chief Executive Pay As 
A Multiple Of Employee 
Average
17
  
United States 531 
Brazil 57 
Mexico 45 
Britain 25 
Canada 21 
France 16 
Germany 11 
Japan 10 
 
Gretchen Morgenson has taken on the challenge of “Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is 
Paid So Much”. She describes a proposal made by Daniel J. Steininger – chairman of the 
Catholic Funds – to limit executive pay at seven corporations to a maximum of 100 times 
the pay of the average worker. 
 
The Steininger Seven are Cendant, Compuware, Delta Airlines, the El 
Paso Corporation, International Paper, Sun Microsystems and Viacom. All 
were picked because their chiefs’ pay had rocketed versus that of their 
average workers.  
The gap between chiefs’ pay and that of lower-level workers has yawned in 
recent years. J.P. Morgan, the financier, is credited with suggesting that 
executives earn no more than 20 times the pay of low-level workers…  
In a letter asking the S.E.C. to exclude the proposal, Cendant said it would 
“impose a constraint” on the salary of its chief executive, Henry R. 
Silverman, cutting it to $2.7 million a year from the $3.3 million promised 
annually until 2012. And Mr. Silverman would lose his annual bonus of 
$100,000 for each penny a share that Cendant earns.  
Of course, Mr. Silverman could cut his pay to zero and not face the 
poorhouse. Brian Foley, a compensation expert in White Plains, said that 
from 1998 to 2002, Mr. Silverman received $36.6 million in salary and 
bonus and reaped $223 million from exercising options. He had 
unexercised options worth $46 million, and his life is insured for $100 
million, at a cost to shareholders of $6.5 million. And Cendant will pay Mr. 
Silverman $83,000 a month after retirement.  
For him to earn all that, his performance must surely be clear and 
measurable. But Cendant’s letter to the S.E.C. calls the fund’s proposal too 
subjective: “How will the company distinguish between those 
achievements stemming from the C.E.O.’s contribution versus those that 
are a result of favorable economic conditions or other factors?” That is 
precisely what critics of executive pay have wondered for years. 18 
 
In the face of these outrageously high American executive salaries, other explanations are 
offered for U.S. deindustrialization. I have dealt with these kinds of distracting arguments 
before; in each case, like the myth of the post-industrial society or that of uncompetitive 
American workers they act as cover stories.  
 
Could the United States be suffering the consequences of having spurred 
the industrial reconstruction of Japan and Germany after World War II? 
The fact is that from 1948 to 1971 Japan received $21.8 million in official 
economic assistance from the United States, while U.S. private investment 
in Japan was negligible. Under the Marshall Plan, West Germany received 
$1.6 billion of economic assistance from the United States.  
But didn’t Germany and Japan get the benefit of building and operating 
new industrial facilities just because the U.S. had destroyed the older ones 
during World War II? On average, manufacturing equipment (except for 
certain units like power plants, railroad roadbeds) have been depreciated in 
the United States, Germany and Japan in cycles of about ten years. This 
points to the importance of the decision processes of industrial 
management that operated over this period, rather than to the unique 
event of new facilities construction some time after World War II. 
Another explanation offered is that the United States just doesn’t have 
“comparative advantage” in the “sunset industries”. The economists’ idea 
of comparative advantage has solid meaning when referring, for example, 
to the natural head start that the United States has in the growing of 
wheat, corn and cotton, or that Quebec has in the production of electricity 
from water power. But comparative advantage loses clear meaning when 
one considers the wide array of products produced in Germany and Japan 
with great success. What is particularly German about the machine tools or 
electric trolleys (“light rail vehicles”) that enjoy a world market? Has 
anyone discovered an inherently Japanese quality in precision 35 mm 
cameras, hi-fi electronics or electron microscopes?19 
 
National culture, geography and history, per se, do not account for either their industrial 
excellence or the U.S. industrial decline. The collapse of industry in the U.S. has been the 
result of managements’ choice to “cash in their chips” rather than value and reinvest in the 
domestic production system.  
By 2003, the list of U.S. industries that are undergoing deindustrialization has gotten quite 
long. U.S. firms in these industries have withheld investments for replenishing or improving 
their domestic production facilities. In the short-term, this strategy reduces operating 
expenses, (associated with new equipment, maintenance etc.) thereby increasing profits. As I 
have been arguing, the long-term cost however is much steeper – destruction of the capacity to 
produce.  
The capacity to produce leans heavily on availability of means of production, which play an 
essential role. Everyone can recognize in the list of the following table both components that 
are widely used in machinery (ball and roller bearings, carburetors, pistons, rings, valves, 
transformers) as well as major classes of machinery, (machine tools, farm machinery, 
construction machinery). These listings appear here because they represent 
deindustrialization writ large. 
The accompanying display on “U.S. Deindustrialization in Production of Machinery” 
shows the marked decline in number of production workers in U.S. manufacturing facilities 
producing capital goods—the baseline machines that are a crucial part of the means of 
production.  
 
U.S. DEINDUSTRIALIZATION IN PRODUCTION OF MACHINERY 
 
Number of Production Workers (1000s) 
Industry 1977 2001 Percent 
Change,  
Machine tools (metal cutting) 37.2 11.6  -69 % 
Rolling mill machinery  5.4 1.8 -67 
Mining machinery 20.3 7.1 -65 
Textile machinery 18.3 6.6 -64 
Calculators and accounting 
equipment 
10.4  3.9* -63  
Construction machinery 111.2 43.7 -61 
Electronic computers (1987 & 
2001) 
54.7  21.3 -61 
Farm machinery and equipment 96.2 41.1 -57 
Oil and gas field machinery 39.8 17.1 -57 
Machine tools (forming) 16.1  7.2 -55  
Turbines and turbine generator 
sets 
24.8 11.8 -52 
Carburetors, pistons, rings, valves 26.0 13.9 -47 
Power-driven hand tools 20.0 11.0 -45 
Air and gas compressors 19.1  11.1 -42 
Motors and generators 74.1 45.9 -38 
Speed changers, drives and gears 17.6 11.0 -38 
Internal combustion engines 65.3 41.2* -37  
Ball and roller bearings 41.3 26.3 -36 
Transformers, except electronic 32.8 22.4* -32  
* 1996 Data [Note: A drop in production was typically paralleled by a drop in the number of 
factories in the given industry, and by an increase in imports]. Source: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Census of Manufactures, 1977; Annual Survey of Manufactures, 2001. 
 
Depletion in U.S. industries has occurred in several different ways: profits are made from 
U.S. sales while production is done abroad by foreign firms buying into American 
companies; American firms maintain a production base in the United States, but put fresh 
capital abroad; an industry’s profitability is maintained for a few firms that service a 
government market—as in shipbuilding—while the whole level of activity of the industry 
declines; managements’ failure to invest in new technology causes a general decline in the 
industry, (such as fishery industries & railroads). The common effect stemming from all the 
depleted industries is fewer production jobs in the United States. 
 
ON THE ROLE OF CHINA: “HIJACKING JOBS” FROM THE U.S. 
In March 2004 the AFL-CIO presented a formal Petition to the government of the United 
States asking for major relief from the effects of industrialization in China on jobs of 
American workers. In a carefully drawn brief, supported by several independent studies of 
industrialization in China, the AFL-CIO charged that American workers are suffering grave 
injury owing to the repressive anti-union policies of the Chinese government, which also 
support ambitions for unlimited profit-making by American and other firms. I have 
excerpted portions of the Petition and these appear in Appendix C. The data summarized 
there offer both a dramatic portrayal of Chinese worker exploitation, as well as drastic and 
strikingly rapid job loss for American workers. Those job losses extend over the whole range 
of manufacturing industry and are bound to have major effect in reducing, even wiping out, 
whole groupings of U.S. worker skills. The wipeout of skilled worker occupations has the 
further effect of requiring unprecedented effort to retrain Americans should there be a 
further interest in serious reindustrialization of the United States.  
More than 2 million factory jobs have been relocated from the U.S. in recent years and 
there doesn’t seem to be a halt in that outflow, (see the Section 301 in appendix). China is 
being marked as a particular villain in this development not only owing to the Chinese wages 
which are dramatically lower than American wages in comparable occupations, but also the 
possible role of the Chinese government as it declines to revalue its currency so that the 
exchange value of the Chinese Yuan is raised thereby making Chinese prices that much more 
competitive versus counterpart goods prices in the U.S.  
Business Week has noted that “fully 65 percent of the growth in Chinese exports over the 
last decade … has been generated by subsidiaries or joint ventures of global multinationals.” 
The rising U.S.-Chinese trade deficit, said Stephen Roach, is “an unmistakable outgrowth of 
the U.S. penchant for outsourcing and China’s rapidly emerging role as a global outsourcing 
platform of choice.” Accordingly, Roach marks the investment export initiatives of U.S. 
industrial firms and financial institutions as being primarily responsible for the continued 
movement of U.S. manufacturing, in this case particularly to China.  
Indeed, notes Business Week, “companies based in North America, Europe, Japan, and 
other Asian nations invested $53 billion in Chinese facilities in 2002, making it the world’s 
largest recipient of foreign direct investment.”20 
 
THE MOVES ARE FOR MORE PROFIT – NOT SURVIVAL  
Closing down U.S. factories in order to relocate manufacturing operations to China often 
requires major personal readjustments for the managers who are directly involved. Such 
considerations can be most important when the relocation move is made by owner-
managers. The scene is different for the management cadres of large multi-division 
international firms whose managers go through careers that normally include the prospect of 
many work relocations.. In either circumstance, however, major industrial relocation moves 
are typically made to obtain greater profitability – rather than assuring continued profitability 
as against near-certain loss. Accordingly, there has been the repeated prospect of more 
profits by making the move to Mexico or China. However, in the case of the television set 
industry “labor accounts for about 15 percent of the cost of making televisions”.21 
Accordingly, the transfer of U.S.-based production to Mexico or China is not a transfer from 
production worker wages of 15 percent of cost, down to worker wages approaching zero, 
but rather a downward wage shift that opens up prospects for greater profit. Consider that 
average compensation costs to hire American workers have now been running at about $22 
an hour in 2003. The alternative in Mexico or China is rather less than that, but not zero.  
One of the features of newspaper coverage of Mexican and Chinese industrialization is 
the very limited systematic reporting on wages paid to production workers in those 
countries. Nevertheless, a move from the U.S. to a country with underemployed and 
underpaid people may make for possible higher profits.  
The fact is however, that since the Second World War, until the close of the twentieth 
century, there has been a dramatic shift in the importance of production worker wages 
compared with salaries of administrative employees – all classes. In 1947, for every dollar in 
production wages paid in U.S. manufacturing, salaried employee payments amounted to 31 
cents. As we have seen, by 1996, for every dollar of payment in production wages, the 
payments to salaried, (administrative) employees amounted to another dollar. Typically 
neglected in accounts about moving U.S. production offshore is reference to the scale of 
administrative salaries in the corporate management of U.S. industrial firms, which now 
equal or exceed the total outlays for production worker wages.  
There is, of course a second and perhaps more important effect from the process of 
deindustrialization of the U.S. Closing production facilities in the United States while 
expanding offshore production, as in Mexico or China often means unloading workforces 
that have made significant advances along the disalienation, (unionization) route in favor of 
employing workers who are beginners in that process. 
 
 
COLLAPSE OF WHOLE INDUSTRIES  THE BIG THREE LEAVE 
DETROIT 
The U.S. auto manufacturers provide another case in point. Once the jewel in the crown of 
American industry, they too are participating in the ravages of deindustrialization. 
 
For a decade after World War II, the automobile industry in the United 
States not only paid the highest wages in the world to its industrial workers 
but also produced the lowest-priced cars in the world, measured in price 
per pound of vehicle. Detroit pay scales were two to three times those of 
autoworkers in Western Europe. But the average productivity of labor in 
the U.S. auto industry, thanks to greater mechanization and more refined 
organization of work, was about three times that of Western Europe. As a 
result, the Detroit product was so attractively priced that it not only 
dominated the U.S. market but was also exported to markets around the 
world.22 
 
By 2001, forty-six years later, the situation had been transformed and imports supplied 61 
percent of the U.S. auto market.23 This process of failure is all the more significant because 
the U.S. auto industry is more than an industrial colossus. Detroit made mass production an 
American and then a worldwide force. Many people were reluctant to accept that these 
castoff industrial workers should redeploy themselves into new-look “services” or high-tech 
occupations. After all, if the United States no longer excelled at rolling cars off the assembly 
line, what was left? “The air has been full of recriminations about who is at fault. The top 
managers of the Big Three have singled out the high wages of U.S. autoworkers as the prime 
cause of their lack of competitiveness in the marketplace”.24 This focus was demonstrated in 
the 2003 contracts with the UAW, which established a two-tier wage system for workers in 
auto parts factories. 
 
New-hires at two big parts supplier companies, Visteon and Delphi, will 
now be paid “competitive wage and benefit levels” approximately $10 
lower than those companies’ current wage of over $25 an hour. The new 
low tier would be permanent, with no “grow-in” to former levels. The 
exact wage is unknown. 
Delphi (30,000 workers) was spun off from GM in 1999 and Visteon 
(22,000) from Ford in 2000. At that time, the union maintained the wage 
parity that had always existed between Big Three assembly, powertrain, 
and stamping workers and those who made parts. 
This year, the UAW reversed course and took explicit action to lower 
wages for 52,000 of its members who have not yet been hired. Current 
Visteon and Delphi workers will be allowed to escape their two-tier 
factories by transferring to Ford and GM plants, as openings occur. When 
bargainers settle on the two-tier wage, it will not be submitted to members 
for ratification. 25 
 
Despite the setback to American autoworkers’ wages, the fact remains that the German and 
Japanese success in gaining a greater share of the U.S. auto market has not been due to 
cheaper labor. In 2001 the average hourly compensation cost, (money plus non-monetary 
benefits) for U.S. autoworkers was $28.93. This was surpassed in Germany where workers 
received $30.60, and nearly matched in Japan at $25.00.26 Despite these similar compensation 
costs, in 2001, Germany shipped cars worth $15 billion to the US. Japan had even greater 
success with $31 billion. Together these two countries are responsible for 43 percent of all 
car imports in the U.S. market.27  
The Big Three American Auto companies, (now Big Two since Daimler Chrysler is 
German) have responded by becoming less American. Whole lines of their cars are 
manufactured abroad and imported. Ironically, Japanese auto firms, Toyota and Honda, have 
opened plants in the U.S. while GM, Ford and Chrysler have been closing them.  
Recall that, during the 1950s, U.S. auto worker wages of two to three times those of 
Western European workers proved no barrier to the U.S. industry’s holding its domestic 
market, as well as sizable markets abroad. Detroit offset the wage differential with high 
productivity of labor and capital. Why is the U.S. auto industry unable today to compensate, 
as it once did so effectively, for differences in labor and other costs? 
Once again, the answers have been well known for decades: 
 
The place to begin is with the quality of the means of production 
themselves, and then the methods of production organization. 
Machine tools are the basic production equipment of the auto industries. 
By 1978, 76 percent of the machine tools used in the U.S. auto industry 
were ten years old or older. Its production equipment was older than the 
average for all U.S. manufacturing (69 percent ten years old and older).28 
The managers of the Big Three failed to modernize and upgrade their 
basic production equipment. Many production divisions were treated as 
“cash cows,” being milked of their assets.29 
But the development of major differences in the organization of 
production between the U.S. and the Japanese auto industries probably 
had the major effect on productivity. The core of the matter is this: major 
Japanese auto firms have learned the connection between stabilization of 
production rates and increased productivity of labor and capital, as well as 
the wide range of cost savings that are made possible when a production 
system is operated in a sustained, stable pattern.30 
  
Similar considerations bear on the efficiency even of entire industries. Thus, when an 
industry is operated in a highly unstable fashion, it suffers penalties in lowered productivity 
of both labor and capital. In the case of U.S. subway car manufacturers, which I will discuss 
more fully in chapter 5, the lack of a stable market, (owing to chaotic and unpredictable 
government financing) encouraged U.S. firms to abandon the industry. This contrasts with 
the cases of France and Japan, where governments supported local subway car 
manufacturers, it being understood that these firms would also gain customers in other 
countries. 
 
STABILIZING OUTPUT FOR PRODUCTIVITY GAIN 
Whatever is being manufactured in a production facility, stabilizing operations is also of 
crucial importance. As stability is achieved, the rates of output of individual machines 
become more consistent so one is able to predict future rates of production with a narrower 
margin of error.  
 
Two ideas are crucial here: stable operation of a single machine – or an 
entire factory – means working at rates within predictable and acceptable 
limits. Average output of machines, even single worker operations, 
improve as there is less variation in output rate. When a power plant is 
operated in a stable manner, more electricity is produced for each ton of 
fuel that is consumed. The rolls in steel rolling mills last longer when they 
are used at more even, less varying speeds.31 
Secondly the stabilization of output rates of individual machines in a 
factory helps raise the productivity of the system as a whole. When output 
is stabilized in an entire factory, there are fewer breakdowns, and the 
average life of machines, for instance metal-cutting tools, is increased, 
resulting in a higher degree of utilization of the production machines (the 
actual production time increases as a proportion of the available time). At 
the same time, stabilization lowers scrap rates and improves the quality of 
product.  
Under these conditions it becomes possible to operate an entire factory 
with a substantially reduced inventory of work in process, since “buffers” 
are not required between operations as insurance against breakdowns. For 
similar reasons inventories of raw materials and purchased components 
can also be reduced. Those reductions, in turn, make possible a larger 
output in proportion to the working capital invested in the plant. Also, 
owing to the higher productivity of individual machines, and lessened 
requirement for factory floor space for in-process storage, a smaller fixed 
investment in machines and factory buildings becomes feasible. All told, 
the stabilization of output in a factory as a whole makes possible 
substantial improvement in the productivity of capital and thereby – 
automatically – in the output per worker hour. 
More is involved here than a simple statistical harmony between men, 
machines and materials. Stabilization of output in an entire production 
system requires a method of organizing work that invites and encourages 
sustained cooperation among workers, technicians, engineers and 
administrators. Such cooperation is the vital element that permits a 
production system to respond to the requirements of stable operation. The 
top-imposed control system favored by American managements has yet to 
match the results in stabilization that are gained thru cooperation.  
An early description and diagnosis of a stabilized system of work 
organization in an auto factory appeared in my1958 book, Decisionmaking 
and Productivity.32 There the operation of the automobile- and tractor-
producing factories of the Standard Motor Company in Coventry, England 
were described and analyzed. The main effects of a stable production 
system were all there: reduced variation in output rates; unusually high 
productivity of capital and labor; strikingly low inventories of work in 
process per vehicle produced, close attention to preventive maintenance 
and markedly efficient performance of emergency maintenance to prevent 
downtime; a sharp increase in average output per worker and output per 
unit of capital investment that corresponded with the stabilization of 
output rate in the factory as a whole; very high product quality.* 
                                                
* The system of work organization that operated in the factories of the Standard Motor Company 
involved a management-union agreement on a “gang system” whereby worker groups took 
responsibility for the detailed allocation of work tasks. Production bonuses were paid to the gang’s 
members on the basis of the output of the group as a whole. In the tractor factory, the entire factory 
formed one gang, with output measured by quality-accepted tractors at the end of the line. Every 
worker, technician, engineer and administrator in the factory knew the production targets for the day 
and the week and could therefore gauge every individual work performance in accordance with the 
requirement of the factory’s goals. There are, of course, alternative possible ways of inducing 
cooperation for the detailed performance of production work. 
 
In the Standard Motor Company the production-oriented management 
defined itself, saying “we try to give a service to the factory.” With respect 
to the familiar process of expansion of managerial control and costs, the 
top management at Standard said: “We just don’t want to have people who 
do empire building. We make it a point of going after a person who 
attempts to enlarge his staff.”33 As might be expected, the Standard Motor 
Company operated with substantially lower administrative costs than did 
other automobile firms of Great Britain, which included Ford and General 
Motors.34 35 
 
Creating a stable environment for production is crucial for the well being of any industry. 
Deindustrialization and outsourcing strike at the heart of this. 
 
THE MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY: DECAY AT THE ROOT 
We can gain a key insight into the state of American production capacity by looking at the 
nuts and bolts industry that make the very means of production. Machine tools are the 
sophisticated machines used to precisely shape metal. As such they are crucial to making the 
machines that are in turn used to make all of the high tech gismos we have come to depend 
on. Without machine tools, modern industry as we know it cannot exist. I examined this 
basic question in my study, Our Depleted Society:  
 
Machine tool production is the industry most basic to a society utilizing 
metal and machines. Machine tools include all those machines that remove 
metal in the form of chips (cutting machines), or that shape metal by 
pressing it between dies (forming machines). The products of this industry, 
the lathes, milling machines, drills, and the like, are used to manufacture all 
other machines including those specialized toward particular products: 
plastics, textiles, farm machines, computers, printers. 36 
 
The last data on age of machine tools in U.S. factories comes from 1996. We find that 1.4 
million, or 60 percent of all machine tools in the U.S. are upwards of 11 years old. The stock 
of forming machines is especially aged, with 71 percent being 11 + years old.37 
 
The growing age of machine tools in use in American factories 
demonstrates that the basic manufacturing equipment for American 
industry is not being replaced. This has two negative consequences: 
productivity improvements offered by new equipment are forgone; and 
secondly, the continual decay in machine tool stock puts the U.S. at a 
progressively greater disadvantage vis-à-vis other industrial and 
industrializing countries that have invested in new machinery. Why has 
U.S. industry delayed in making this investment? The firms using the 
existing machine tools have insisted that the savings from the introduction 
of new machines must pay off the initial cost of the machine within a 
period of perhaps four to five years, or even sooner.  
This means that it is not enough for new machines to have a higher output 
per hour of use, that is, greater productivity. It means that it is also 
necessary for the new machine’s price and cost of operation to be low 
enough to register in the form of payback of the initial cost within 4 or 5 
years. But the prices of new US-made machine tools during the last 
decades of the 20th century were too high to be attractive to machine-tool 
users on a large scale. The result is that the demand for new machine tools 
has been so low that the metal-working machinery stock of the United 
States industry has aged, leaving the U.S. with a progressively less efficient 
set of basic production machines available to them.38 
 
Traditionally, U.S. machine tool factories did not use mass production techniques, (despite 
their product being the very basis of mass production). Furthermore, U.S. machine tool 
firms diversified the line of products they produce, partially to differentiate their own 
products from the competition. As a result U.S. machine tool firms wound up producing 
small quantities of many different models. This raised the cost of manufacturing and became 
the basis for a high selling price. Industry-wide standardization as a method to cut 
manufacturing costs was ignored by management because it would allow customers to use 
replacement parts or accessories from competing firms. (Indeed, to my knowledge, there has 
been no extensive study of the cost saving that might be obtained in the machine-tool 
industry if standardization were to be widely practiced.) 
Until 1978, the U.S. machine-tool industry was a premier producer for the industrial 
markets of the world. By 2002, the industry shipped only $1.9 billion of machine tools, 
exporting $0.8 billion, while the U.S. imported $2.3 billion.39 The Pentagon and NASA – which 
purchased an increasing proportion of machine tools sold in the U.S. - were not interested in 
sponsoring research for developing production methods intended to advance manufacturing 
productivity of the machine tool industry. Since industry and non-military branches of 
government both neglected to support university research on improving production 
capability, relevant departments in U.S. engineering schools focused on satisfying the needs 
of the military and space agencies. The engineering schools, lacking financial support from 
the non-defense agencies or industry, conformed to the defense / space agencies’ interests 
and treated production capability as a less important function. In Japan, however, different 
priorities ruled. The government encouraged work on modularization and standardization in 
order to create low-cost products that had a wide-range of commercial applications. 
Furthermore Japanese firms were the first to apply numerical and computer control 
automation technology, (which had first been developed in the U.S.) to small and medium 
size machine tools that were affordable for small and medium size companies. Clearly the 
Japanese machine tool industry had achieved a comparative advantage.  
 
PROFITS FROM DECAY? – THE CASE OF SINGER 
If we want to see the consequences of decades of deindustrialization we can take the case of 
Singer sewing machines. 
 
The story of the U.S. sewing-machine industry offers a good example of 
how moneymaking and basic economic deterioration can go hand in hand. 
The 113-acre Singer Company factory in Elizabethport, New Jersey, was 
the last place in the United States where household sewing machines were 
manufactured. In 1947, the factory employed around 10,000 people. By 
1964 it was down to 3,000 workers. The factory closed in the late 1960’s. 
What happened to the once major United States sewing-machine industry 
as a producer of these equipments? 
The essential weakness of Singer’s operation in Elizabethport was this: In 
order to produce sewing machines that were competitive with the output 
of Japanese workers, who were at that time paid one sixth of United States 
wages, it was essential that productivity in the U.S. plants exceed the 
productivity of operations in Japan by a factor of about five. But Singer’s 
management failed to install the modern high-productivity equipment 
required to make the needed gains in productivity. The production 
workers in Elizabethport were stuck with operating a stock of largely aged 
equipment. In 1963, 40 percent of Singer’s foundry equipment was at least 
twenty years old, contrasted with a national average of 5 percent. 
Furthermore, 80 percent of the Singer factory’s metal-cutting machine 
tools were over twenty years old, contrasted with a national average of 37 
percent. 
Singer also resisted the use of standardized components for its sewing 
machines to a truly remarkable degree. They not only manufactured their 
own screws, but also the very tools for making screws to their own special 
dimensions. Manufacturing specialized screws may have once seemed like 
a shrewd way to generate a captive spare-parts business, but by the middle 
of the 20th century manufacturing parts in relatively small quantities was 
undoubtedly more expensive than using readily available mass-produced 
parts. Equally important in preventing productivity gains, Singer failed to 
redesign their product in order to simplify its manufacture. Singer used 91 
colors for their machines and kept over 80,000 different parts in inventory. 
They stocked about 100 kinds of flat, metallic washers with less than 1” 
outside diameter. The Singer Company, (as well as its former U.S. 
competitors) did not bother to do the job of standardization that was so 
competently mastered by the Japanese sewing-machine industry.  
The story of American firms who neglected industrial research, investment 
in modern machinery, standardization and simplification of design has 
been repeated many times and was certainly important in the ongoing 
disappearance of U.S. manufacturing industries such as: machine tools, 
commercial electronics, household appliances, televisions, clothing, 
internal combustion engines, turbines and generators, office equipment, 
and machinery of all kinds.40 
Nevertheless, even without mechanization and systematic production 
organization, Singer developed a strong financial position. The Singer 
Company and its reputable sewing machines had been household words in 
the United States and other countries for over a century.41 
 
By 2003 Singer had manufacturing facilities in China and several in Brazil. Management and 
marketing offices and facilities exist in 17 countries. The management controls 17,500 
employees, (mainly in retailing its products) and is confident of its ability to “offer 
competitive, state-of-the-art computer[ized] machines and full-featured mechanical machines 
by working closely with third-party manufacturers who supply the Company with product. 
The Company plans to establish a new sewing machine research and development center in 
Shanghai in 2003.”42 
The formula for Singer’s financial success adds up to this: expansion of production and 
sales abroad; expansion of ownership in the United States; expansion of sales in the United 
States, based upon overseas production with low-wage labor; contraction of sewing-machine 
production within the United States, owing to failure to offset U.S. costs by improved 
productivity. By the conventional tests of financial success the Singer record is entirely 
commendable. By the test of participation in a viable American production system, the 
Singer record is calamitous. 
If this sort of pattern were the performance of a few firms, a rarity, a set of exotic 
contrasts, then there would be little point in pursuing this analysis. But the combination of 
financial success and decaying productive capability has become a far-ranging pattern that 
threatens the viability of the American industrial production system at its base. 
 
DIVERSITY OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION 
Basic manufacturers like Singer are not the only casualties of deindustrialization. Workers 
and engineers at high tech companies like the Boeing Corporation have also paid the price. 
This lead Boeing engineers to unionize and stand up for their basic rights as workers.  
The engineers at the Boeing Corporation in Seattle have been responsible for the main 
design and production work for Boeing Aircraft and Space Vehicles. They are concerned 
that the apparent Boeing top management policy has caused their U.S. employment to drop 
by about 50 percent during the first few years of the new century. Evidently, Boeing 
management has desired to abandon much of its metalworking production. Instead it has 
instituted a series of outsourcing contracts negotiated with assorted subcontracting firms in 
Japan, China, Russia & Poland. All told, the domestic content of successive Boeing aircraft 
has been declining sharply. Among the engineer unionists at Boeing, the judgment is that 
Boeing top management is moved by an anti-union imperative that influences where work is 
to be done.  
As of June 2002 Boeing management reported that “currently some 5,300, or about 3 
percent of the 174,000 employees of Boeing and its subsidiaries, are based outside the 
United States.”43 In Moscow, Boeing has organized a design center that accounts for 500-600 
jobs. In their search for further outsourcing of engineering design work Boeing has 
established a research and technology center in Spain, which began with fewer than 100 
employees, but with prospects for further expansion. Boeing’s pattern of “going global” is 
informed by the current business model that favors free movement of capital that will 
maximize short term financial gain for the firm and with no sense of obligation to the larger 
United States community. While Boeing strategy may be very well suited to the desires of its 
shareholders, it should be contrasted with the business strategy of the Airbus Company, 
which has become a major competitor to Boeing.  
The business and technical strategy of Airbus combines the usual business interest 
together with a social interest. The latter stipulates that a corporation has an obligation to 
invest domestically – in the case of Airbus this means investing and subcontracting for their 
production work among the principal countries of Western Europe. It means more than 
that, because, once committed to the importance of investing domestically, the Airbus 
managers and engineers have an automatic interest in contributing to the competence of the 
assorted suppliers who serve Airbus throughout Western Europe. Boeing managers and 
engineers are under no such obligation. The competence and technical / economic well 
being of American workers and engineers are not part of their sphere of normal concern, 
only the near term profitability of the company and the value of its stock.  
A focus on short-term investor interest as a prime decision criterion therefore tends to 
run counter to public interest. So while Boeing strategy with ever more outsourcing from the 
U.S. may be great for shareholders, it does not contribute to the continuity and competence 
of employment among Boeing’s blue and white-collar workers.  
  
Nearly 12 years ago, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Boeing started 
recruiting out-of-work Russian aerospace engineers to collaborate on space 
and commercial-airplane projects. At first, their numbers were small. But 
the Russians did good work for as little as $5,400 a year. Boeing began to 
view its Russian staff as the vanguard of a new push into the European 
market, and in 1998 it opened its Moscow Design Center, which a year ago 
boasted nearly 700 engineers. From the day the center opened, engineers 
at Boeing’s Seattle hub had voiced concerns. Last year, [2002] those fears 
boiled over. 
Boeing’s 22,000 engineers in Seattle, represented by the Society of 
Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), threatened to 
walk out in December, when their contract expired, if the Russian venture 
wasn’t cut back. Partly as a result, Boeing reduced its corps of Moscow 
engineers to about 350, though the company [management] won’t be 
precise. “The underlying fear is that we’re giving away our technology and 
our competitive advantage, and we’re losing jobs,” says Dave Landress, a 
test engineer and union rep. The union has good reason for concern: 
Struggling to reduce costs to cope with the sharp falloff in orders from the 
ailing airline industry, Boeing has laid off 5,000 engineers since 2001. 
And Boeing still plans to shift jobs to Russia in the future, company 
insiders say. 
The strategy is to integrate the cheaper Russian engineers into the design 
process for everything Boeing makes. The Russian staff--spread over 
seven cities--already works on everything from redesigning jet-wing parts 
to designing components for the International Space Station. Boeing’s 
[management’s] other goal is to develop a 24-hour global workforce, made 
possible by a satellite link from Russia to Boeing’s Seattle offices.44 
 
Workers at many other U.S. companies have faced the same struggles as the Boeing 
engineers. Not all of them have been as vocal or as visible in their efforts to protest profit 
driven “globalizing” managers. Let us look at some other key examples. 
Levi Strauss – the famous blue jean manufacturer – ended U.S. production on Sept. 25th 
2003, by closing the last of its U.S. plants. Levi’s closed a total of 7 plants in 2002-3, putting 
5,600 U.S. workers out of jobs. This was on top of 24 previous factory closings that put 
13,000 employees out of work from 1997 – 2002. Some aspects of the Levi’s story deserve 
particular attention. The Levi’s employees who were laid off in 2002-3 were given a 
substantial severance package including pay, medical coverage and an enhanced pension 
plan. This is cited only to show that the corporation has a large amount of cash at their 
disposal.* They have opted to using their funds for paying severances, relocating 
                                                
* When I asked Levi Strauss what they spent on Research & Development [for technology and 
productivity improvement] they responded by hanging up the phone!  
 
manufacturing abroad and focusing on marketing rather than manufacturing as the strategic 
activity of the management.45 
The Carrier Corporation, the largest manufacturer of air conditioning equipment in the 
world, is planning to close its two manufacturing plants in East Syracuse- which provided 
employment for generations of Syracuse residents—laying off 1,200 workers. Carrier, “an 
emblematic employer … said it would not build its air conditioners in New York State any 
more simply because the company can make more money by building them elsewhere”.46 
The manufacturing of refrigeration units is to be relocated to Singapore, in part to be closer 
to the Asian-dominated shipping container industry to whom Carrier is a supplier.47 This is 
an example of how the loss of one manufacturing industry can cause supplier industries to 
follow. 
In a survey story on deindustrialization in Rockford, Il (New York Times, January 4th, 2004) 
we learn about “The Joyless Recovery”. This dispatch found that 11,000 jobs had been 
terminated in that city between 2000 and 2003. This included 1,000 jobs in a factory 
producing for Motorola. That firm shut down the plant in Rockford and invested $1.9 
billion in China.  
The staple Rockford firm, called Rockford Power Train has “stopped producing most of 
its components at home and started buying almost all of them abroad – from South Korea, 
Poland, Germany, and most of all China”. In parallel, “the number of employees in 
Rockford has dropped from 800 in 1988 to 250 and the work is limited, largely to assembly, 
quality control and management”.  
In parallel with these strategic moves of deindustrialization, a new and rapidly expanding 
enterprise is depicted in Rockford Il. “Machinery from closed factories is scrapped, and the 
metal is sent to Chinese steel mills.”*  
 On November 23, 2003 Julia Bauer reported in The Grand Rapids Press that the 
Electrolux Corporation was planning to shut down its refrigerator factory in Michigan and 
move the plant to Mexico.  
 
Greenville’s massive Electrolux refrigerator plant isn’t losing money. It just 
isn’t raking it in fast enough. The CEO of the huge Swedish appliance 
maker explained that squeeze in a telephone conference with stock market 
analysts in Stockholm last month.  
… On the same day, Carl Hoag and 2,700 other Electrolux employees 
arrived at work to hear the company’s stunning announcement it may shut 
the 100-year-old Greenville factory in 2005 and move production to 
Mexico…  
It could save Electrolux $81 million a year. But shutting the plant would be 
crippling to employees and the town where the plant is the largest 
employer and taxpayer. The specter haunts workers who fear losing jobs 
that pay $13 to $15 an hour, health insurance, paid vacations and pensions. 
                                                
* A reader with a reasonably long memory may recall that this is precisely the pattern that once 
prevailed before World War II as dismantling of many U.S. industrial facilities and transportation 
units, (like bridges, elevated roadways) proceeded with the scrap metal sold off to Japan’s steel mills 
which were rapidly expanding at that time.  
 
“You see some of them go right to their knees bawling. They don’t know 
what they’re going to do. It just tears your insides out. It’s too 
devastating,” said Hoag, president of Local 371…  
“About 200,000 jobs have gone from the border area in Mexico over to 
China,” Straberg [CEO of Electrolux] said in the conference call. “When I 
met President Fox here in Stockholm . . . he was very concerned about 
that, and was very supportive of any investment that companies like us 
would make in these areas.” … 
…Last week, the Greenville City Council ponied up $12,500 for a plant-
construction feasibility study. The Michigan Economic Development 
Corp. is paying the other half of the $25,000 bill to hire a consultant for 
the study that includes cost estimates…  
Hoag [the union president] said he is frustrated with the way state officials 
have figured the plant’s costs, at roughly $55,000 per employee. “They take 
the gas bill, the light bill, the trucking bill, and the wages for the plant 
manager, the engineers, and the line workers, and pool them all together, 
then they divide by how many workers there are,” Hoag said. The average 
Greenville worker makes about $13 an hour, he said. With insurance and 
other benefits, the total jumps to more than $25 an hour. That’s 10 times 
the hourly wages and benefits in Mexico, a cold fact that scares Greenville 
workers…  
[According to Evans, Electrolux spokesman,] “all other major competitors 
have established significant manufacturing bases for refrigerators in 
Mexico.” Those include General Electric, Whirlpool, Maytag, Samsung, 
LG (formerly GoldStar) and Haier. Last week, Michigan-based Whirlpool 
said it was expanding its Mexican refrigerator plant to shift production of 
side-by-side units from Fort Smith, Ark. …  
To date, Electrolux has eliminated 4,330 workers, shaving its work force to 
78,000 worldwide. * 48 
 
From examining a careful biography of Jack Welch’s stewardship of General Electric we 
learn that “GE has either closed or sold 98 plants in the United States during the Welch era, 
43 percent of the 228 it operated in 1980”.49 More recently we learn from Business Week 50 
that General Electric currently has 10,000 employees in China, will have 20,000 workers in 
India by 2004, and is investing in a $64 million technology and R&D center in Shanghai, 
which will employ an additional 1,200 by 2005. The type of work which is being moved by 
GE to the India and China facilities include finance, information technology support, and 
R&D for medical, lighting and aircraft.  
 
                                                
* A transcript of Straberg’s conversation with analysts is available online at 
electrolux.com/node571.asp then select the Oct. 21 “Questions and answers from the report for the 
first nine months of 2003.” 
THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF N. CAROLINA * 
Deindustrialization not only affects whole companies, it has transformed the lives of workers 
in whole states. To give a closer picture of how the loss of manufacturing jobs is occurring 
in everyday America, here is the state of North Carolina as an example. In the late 1800’s 
manufacturing in North Carolina was focused largely on cigarette manufacturing. At the turn 
of the 20th century, cotton and furniture manufacturing became more important but it was 
only in the 1950’s that the value of manufactured goods surpassed agricultural production. 
Indeed, by the 1990’s, compared with all other states, North Carolina had the greatest 
percentage of its workers in manufacturing jobs.51 More recently, however, North Carolina 
has been subject to the same factors that are killing U.S. manufacturing nationwide.  
Manufacturing employment in North Carolina dropped from 834,300 in January 1990 to 
about 599,400 by September 2003—a loss of 28 percent in less than 13 years.52 By February, 
2001 there were “fewer than half the 400,000 textile and apparel jobs that dominated North 
Carolina employment in 1980.” Several decisions affecting investment in North Carolina had 
a crucial effect on the subsequent development. 
 
The unionized heavy industry of the Upper Midwest never took root in 
North Carolina. Instead, the state became the South’s most industrialized 
through thousands of low-wage, low-skill jobs like those in textile mills. … 
in 1990, a group of business leaders told United Airlines not to build a 
maintenance plant that would have added 5,000 high-paying jobs to the 
state, because its union shop would not be welcome. The airline instead 
built in Indianapolis.53 
 
From 1990 to 2002, there were 933 reported factory closings in North Carolina, putting 
142,891 people out of work.54 The ten largest closings are given here. 
 
Ten Largest Factory Closings, North Carolina, 1995-2002 
Date Company City Product  Jobs 
Lost 
Reason for 
Closing 
6/1/1996 Black & Decker 
Corp. 
Tarboro Power 
Hand tools 
900 Cut Costs 
6/1/2002 Abbott 
Laboratories 
Laurinbur
g 
Anesthesia
/ Med. 
Kits 
900 Consolidati
on 
5/1/1998 Stevcoknit 
Fabric 
Company 
Wallace Fabric 846 Restructurin
g 
                                                
* Why North Carolina? North Carolina is perhaps the only state that has been keeping track of 
factory closings. While state data is commonly available on employment, the database created and 
published by the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, that records details of 
individual factory closings in their state is truly unique. Their database is compiled from surveys of 
newspaper accounts of plant closings statewide, and from reports submitted directly to the 
Employment Security Commission. The fact that this database is such an exception, and that no 
similar database exists at the national level, means that gauging the extent and pace of 
deindustrialization, (factory closings) is severely hampered. 
8/1/1995 Brown & 
Williamson 
Tobacco 
Corporation 
Reidsville Cigarettes 840 Corporate 
Restructurin
g 
1/1/1999 Windmere 
Durable 
Holdings 
Asheboro Small 
kitchen 
appliances 
840 Consolidati
on 
7/1/1996 Perdue Farms 
Inc. 
Siler City Poultry 800 Restructurin
g 
6/1/1997 Dayco Products Waynesvil
le 
Ind. 
Hose/Belt
s 
770 Competitio
n 
12/1/199
6 
Fieldcrest 
Cannon, Inc. 
Eden Blankets 750 Division 
Sold 
2/1/2002 Ansell Golden 
Needles 
Wilkesbo
ro 
Industrial 
knitted 
gloves 
750 Relocating 
to Mexico 
12/1/200
0 
Swift Denim Erwin Denim 740 Cost  
reductions 
 
There was also a definite clustering of factory closings from 1990 to 2002. That is what 
appears in the following ranking of factory closings with Textile & Knit Goods and Apparel 
leading the pack, followed by solid representation from Furniture, Electronics, Motor Vehicle 
(Parts and Assembly) and Food Products. 
  
North Carolina Factory 
Closings,  
Selected Industries (1990 – 2002) 
55 
Textile & Knit Goods 234 
Apparel 178 
Furniture 75 
Electronics & Electrical 
Equipment 
30 
Food Products 17 
Motor Vehicle Industry (parts, 
assembly) 
17 
Industrial Equipment & 
Machinery 
12 
Plastics 10 
Medical Equipment & 
Pharmaceuticals 
8 
Wire Products 7 
Paper Products 6 
Air Conditioning Equipment 5 
 
As in other states, multiple factory closings in particular industries have a particularly 
destructive effect on workers in that region. Workers with similar skills and work experience 
are left to compete for jobs at the remaining factories. When the laid-off workers are forced 
to take up work in a new industry, the experience they accumulated in their previous line of 
work may be wasted.  
Beyond the loss of employment: once a set of the factories for a particular industry type 
has been shut down, it becomes difficult to restart production. Specialized people and 
equipment are dispersed. Training of new workers for that field stops, and suppliers to that 
industry may also have a difficult time staying afloat. In this barren environment, setting up a 
factory may require bringing in expertise from abroad. Furthermore, a new factory will be 
competing against foreign firms who are in motion, and are working in an environment 
where necessary inputs are available. For these reasons it is likely that most of the U.S. manufacturing 
sectors that were shut down will never be revived except as part of a national reindustrialization effort. 
 
U.S. FIRMS MOVE WHITE COLLAR WORK ABROAD 
By now people have noticed that the loss of jobs to foreign locations is not limited to the 
manufacturing and blue-collar workers.  
 
Movement of U.S. White Collar Jobs 
“Offshore” 56  
 2005 2015 
LIFE SCIENCES 3,700 37,000 
LEGAL 14,000 75,000 
ART, DESIGN 6,000 30,000 
MANAGEMENT 37,000 288,000 
BUSINESS 
OPERATIONS 
61,000 348,000 
COMPUTER 109,000 473,000 
ARCHITECTURE 32,000 184,000 
SALES 29,000 227,000 
OFFICE 
SUPPORT 
295,000 1,700,000 
TOTAL 588,000 3,300,000 
 
The kinds of jobs that are being lost in the U.S. to foreign countries are changing. 
Increasingly, jobs in professional fields like aeronautical engineering, software design, stock 
analysis and research & design are being shifted abroad. Major Wall Street firms like J.P. 
Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Citigroup have begun 
establishing departments in India to handle various tasks such as research, data cleansing, 
creation of presentations and banking & mutual fund operations.57 Intel, an important maker 
of computer processors, has 1,000 software engineers in China and India and will increase 
jobs in India to 3,000 by 2005. Boeing has cut 5,000 U.S. engineers since 2001 and plans to 
hire at its design center in Moscow that now employs about 700 engineers. Oracle is 
increasing its Indian software design, customer support and accounting staff to 4,000. IBM 
plans to lay off 4,730 of its well-paid technical staff, “some of whom may be required to 
train the foreign workers who will replace them”.58  
New companies have sprung up that specialize in contracting out customer service calls, 
paperwork processing and other office work to locations in the Third World and the 
numbers of jobs they represent is increasing. These firms have been garnering major new 
clients. Accenture will have 5,000 people in the Philippines by 2004. Conseco has 1,700 in 
India and plans for 3 more centers. Delta Air Lines has 6,000 reservation and service 
workers in India and the Philippines. HSBC has 4,000 employees in China & India. The 
pattern is repeated endless. And workers pay the price 
 
COMPELLED TO TRAIN YOUR REPLACEMENT 
High tech workers are no longer immune to these corrosive trends. Indeed, in some cases, 
they are literally forced to train their replacements. 
 
Scott Kirwin clung to his job at a large investment bank through several 
rounds of layoffs last year. Friends marveled at the computer 
programmer’s ability to dodge pink slips during the worst technology 
downturn in a decade. 
Kirwin is among what appears to be a growing number of American 
technology workers training their foreign replacements - a humiliating 
assignment many say they assume unwittingly or reluctantly, simply to stay 
on the job longer or secure a meager severance package. 
… The L-1 [visa] allows companies to transfer workers from overseas 
offices to the United States for up to seven years - ostensibly to familiarize 
them with corporate culture or to import workers with “specialized 
knowledge.” 
Tech bellwethers including IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco Systems, Oracle 
and Microsoft use L-1 workers but won’t disclose how many they import. 
Many bring in workers through consulting firms, usually Indian companies 
such as Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys Technologies and Wipro 
Technologies. 
Dallas-based Texas Instruments also imports L-1 electrical engineers. With 
U.S. colleges graduating fewer U.S.-born engineers and the population of 
foreign-born science graduates mushrooming, TI has to look overseas for 
talent, spokesman Dan Larson said.59 
 
Here’s what typically happens: U.S. workers getting pink slips are told they can get another 
paycheck or beefed-up severance if they’re willing to teach workers from India, China and 
other countries how to do their jobs. The foreign workers typically arrive for a few weeks or 
months of training. When they leave, they take U.S. jobs with them. The U.S. employees 
who trained them are then laid off. Employers say they need workers to train replacements 
to ensure a seamless transition, but the practice is coming under fire.60 
During 2003, economic development in India has attracted special attention as that 
country’s economy has been made a target by major Wall Street firms, including J.P. Morgan, 
Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley, joined a chase for more highly skilled Indian labor. 
One American senior financial analyst reports that “a junior … research analyst from an Ivy 
League school costs $150,000 a year” … “while an Indian equivalent from a top business 
school would cost $35,000 a year.”61 A J.P. Morgan spokeswoman indicated that “hiring 
inexpensive junior level researchers in India will free J.P. Morgan’s highly paid senior 
analysts to spend more time with the companies they cover and with investors.”  
 
Salary Comparisons, United 
States & India 
 United 
States 
India 
Software 
Programmer 
$66,100  $10,000 
Mechanical 
Engineer 
$55,600   $5,900 
IT Manager $55,000  $8,500 
Accountant $41,000  $5,000 
Financial 
Operations 
$37,625  $5,500 
Source: Paras Group, 2002;  
International Labour Organization  
 
Accordingly, J.P. Morgan plans to hire a few dozen researchers in Bombay by the close of 
2003. Morgan Stanley “which already has investment banking and mutual fund operations in 
India will employ a similar number of researchers this year, also in Bombay. Both teams will 
consist of junior level analysts collecting data, analyzing balance sheets and working on basic 
financial models.” “Merrill Lynch has an investment banking, brokerage and asset 
management joint venture in India as well as a technology development center to build 
proprietary software for its global operations.”62 Goldman Sachs expects to have an Indian 
unit with 250 employees. Also, very large firms like Citigroup “are expanding the Indian side 
of their corporate and investment banking activities.” All told outsourcing of business-
process jobs by American companies is predicted to grow to 3.3 million jobs and $136 
billion in wages by 2015, up from $4 billion in wages in 2000.63 It is expected that most of 
the work will go to China, India, the Philippines and Russia.  
Specialists in these financial operations “see the trend accelerating. Mr. Gentle of Deloitte 
Consulting has forecast that ‘financial services companies will move a million jobs, mainly 
back-office and technology related work to India by 2008.” 
We are further advised that “at top Indian business schools like the Indian Institute of 
Management, the prospect of a job with top Wall Street firms has students excited.” The 
New York Times reports that the average entry-level salary for graduates of a top Indian 
business school was $13,226 for jobs in India.64 
What is the U.S. government’s role in all this? 
The federal government of the United States has been actively playing a part in all these 
processes of outsourcing work from the United States. A principal federal government 
operation is contained in the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, (OPIC), a federal 
agency that provides loans and investment insurance to U.S. companies doing business 
around the world. A critical assessment of OPIC operations was released by the Cato 
institute, a conservative, libertarian think tank in Washington D.C. According to the Cato 
report, “nearly all of the agency’s assistance goes to large corporations, such as Citibank, 
Enron, Caterpillar Corporation and, Bechtel…”65 
What is government doing? Branches of state and local governments have begun to use 
offshoring as well. For instance the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, (which 
most would assume is for developing a workforce actually located in Indiana) gave a $15.2 
million contract to the U.S. affiliate of Bombay based, Tata Consultancy Services to maintain 
and update its computer programs, utilizing their expertise in offshore development in India to 
arrange for their employees in Bombay to perform the work. (The contract was later 
cancelled by Indiana Governor Joe Kernan following public protest.)66 
 
THE TRUE SCALE OF U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT 
Nevertheless, the true human cost of these harsh patterns of deindustrialization, in numbers 
of unemployed workers, has been significantly undercounted.  
At the close of 2003 the official count of jobless in the U.S. was 5.9 percent. Yet a Los 
Angeles Times analysis explains how the actual number of unemployed was really 9.7 percent. 
 
The nation’s official jobless rate is 5.9%, a relatively benign level by 
historical standards. But economists say that figure paints only a partial — 
and artificially rosy — picture of the labor market.  
To begin with, there are the 8.7 million unemployed, defined as those 
without a job who are actively looking for work. But lurking behind that 
group are 4.9 million part-time workers … who say they would rather be 
working full time — the highest number in a decade.  
There are also the 1.5 million people who want a job but didn’t look for 
one in the last month. Nearly a third of this group … were too depressed 
about the prospect of finding anything. Officially termed “discouraged,” 
their number has surged 20% in a year. Add these three groups together 
and the jobless total for the U.S. hits 9.7%, up from 9.4% a year ago.  
A new way that people seem to be joining this category is by getting 
themselves declared disabled. … eligible for government payments while 
removing them from the unemployment rolls… From 1983 to 2000 … the 
number of non-elderly adults receiving government disability payments 
doubled from 3.8 million to 7.7 million.  
Another way in which people forgo an appearance on the unemployment 
rolls is if they decide to go into business for themselves. There are 9.6 
million people who say they are self-employed full time, a number that 
rose 118,000 last month. Without the recent increase in self-employed, the 
jobless number would look much worse.67 
 
Economists at the Washington D.C. Economic Policy Institute have calculated the balance, 
by state, of jobs gained (as from exports) and the jobs lost (as from imports that displaced 
U.S. workers).68 From 1993, the start of NAFTA, through 2002, the U.S. trade deficit with 
Canada and Mexico accounted for “displacement of production that supported 879,280 U.S. 
jobs.” There was net job loss in every state, and 26 states each had more than 10,000 job losses. 
The top 5 job losing states are shown here. 
 
California 115,723 
New 
York 
56,793 
Michigan 51,466 
Texas 50,270 
Ohio 46,593 
 
These numbers mark the formation of concentrated job losses, wipeout of whole 
manufacturing industries and creation of ghost towns.  
 
WAGES AND HEAVY MACHINERY 
Ironically, the Chinese government has been following a very different course of action. 
While the cost of labor has been regarded as a central issue in labor-intensive manufacturing 
operations, the picture is rather different in the production and utilization of important 
classes of heavy machinery. On January 1, 2003 the New York Times reported, “China has 
awarded a potentially lucrative contract to lengthen the world’s first commercial magnetic-
levitation rail system to cities surrounding Shanghai”. All this after the prime ministers of 
Germany and China took a test ride on the new high-speed train, which is propelled by 
magnets. The Times reported that “The train reached its designated maximum speed of 266 
miles per hour over the nineteen miles between Shanghai financial district and its main 
international airport…” The German firms that designed and produced the new Maglev 
train were Siemens and ThyssenKrupp. New Maglev trains covering 180 miles and costing 
more than $5 billion are being negotiated.  
The critical point here is: China, a country with one of the lowest wage standards in the 
world for industrial production work, is buying new railroad equipment from German firms 
which pay the highest production worker wage in the world. The full meaning of this 
astonishing situation has not registered in United States industrial circles where the 
production worker’s wage is treated as the primary determinant for locating industrial work. 
Typically, the importance of quality in heavy machinery like railroad equipment, and major 
capital goods is often overlooked. Furthermore rail equipment must withstand heavy usage 
and reliability and safety is indispensable.  
Heavy industrial machinery also includes the important class of earthmoving mining and 
construction machines. These equipments are typically large, costly and quality is worth even 
premium prices to the purchaser. This is so because unscheduled downtime and breakdowns 
in such equipment spells schedule failure in production or transportation. The cost of lost 
work time and potential penalties for late completion on large capital investment projects far 
outweighs any savings to be had from purchasing less reliable machinery.  
The role of American exports to China is of particular relevance to the realm of heavy 
earth moving, construction equipment. The New York Times reports on Dec. 2nd, 2003 that 
China has emerged as the world’s largest market for heavy-duty construction equipment, and 
companies from around the world have rushed exports there to meet its needs. 
And further: “China is also trying to build an interstate highway system more extensive 
than America’s in just fifteen years, while practically every large Chinese city is building or 
has just completed a big new airport.” 
All this creates a demand for equipment and Chinese construction companies have been 
buying big vehicles at a rate dwarfing sales in all of North America or Europe. This major 
market for heavy earthmoving and related construction equipment has bearing on another 
side of U.S. trade with China, namely the role of capital goods produced in the United States 
and capable of finding a ready market in China.  
At the same time that Chinese manufacturing industries are growing at astonishing rates, 
important international companies like Caterpillar (U.S.), Daewoo (Korea), Komatsu and 
Hitachi (Japan), are all undertaking major investments of their own to build this class of 
equipment in China. “Caterpillar, by far the worlds largest maker of construction equipment 
is interested in buying stakes in ‘four or five’ Chinese equipment makers…” 69 These 
comments bear directly on the quality of capital goods and tell us why there is this booming 
market in China for American, Japanese, Korean and other heavy earth moving equipment 
manufacturing firms.  
Keith Bradscher reports from Shanghai to the New York Times that Chinese domestic 
companies producing this class of equipment have been selling them for as little as $55,000 a 
piece, half the price of American and Japanese models. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
domestically produced equipments in this class hold just 10 percent of the domestic market, 
“because their models break down frequently and it can take up to three weeks to get 
replacement parts, according to an officer of the Off-Highway Research firm.”70 
The crucial point here is that quality has major bearing on the usefulness of heavy 
transportation, construction, earthmoving, mining and related machines. Thus, frequent 
breakdowns of heavy earth-moving equipment spell breakdown of production schedules on 
large capital investment projects.  
Owing to these considerations, says Bradscher, “all this will make it harder and slower but 
not impossible for Chinese companies to challenge the likes of Caterpillar in its home 
market someday.” But that day has not yet arrived, and a substantial period of industrial –
technical development will be required before China will be able to export in this class of 
capital goods. This is the judgment of an official of the Association of Equipment 
Manufacturers, a U.S. trade group headquartered in Milwaukee.71 
 
 
PROFITS WITHOUT ANY PRODUCTION AT ALL  
In the U.S., it has been business as usual. The end of the 20th and opening of the 21st 
centuries was not only the scene of computerization of an endless array of activities, but also 
a time when the populace was persuaded that it could, and should participate in the market 
for securities. Thus, a major part of American society made itself a participant in the boom 
and bust of all manner of corporate securities. Jonathan A. Knee—in a masterly review for 
the New York Times (Oct. 26th 2003) of two principal books on the Enron debacle—captured 
the essence of the speculative boom and bust … enlargements of money values without any 
substantive base. Taken together the first and final paragraphs captured the essence of the 
development.  
  
The technology and telecommunications boom made fools of all of us. 
From the corporate executives who promised results that in hindsight 
seem absurd to the ordinary day traders who convinced themselves that 
they were channeling the legendary investor Benjamin Graham, all were 
overcome with a complex mixture of credulity, jealousy, vanity and greed 
that made the boom possible. In between were the enablers -- the 
regulators, bankers, analysts, consultants, accountants, lawyers, credit 
agencies and journalists who could have done something to stop the 
madness, but did nothing until way too late. Even this group seems to 
have been in part genuinely swept away with the euphoria of the age; for 
instance, Goldman Sachs did not just take the Internet grocer Webvan 
public, it invested at least $100 million of its own money at an astounding 
valuation. The difficulty in distinguishing the delusional from the 
dishonest is why prosecutors are having such a hard time bringing 
successful indictments in even the most obvious cases of fraud and why 
social historians will kill many trees trying to come to grips with what really 
happened….72 
 
He concluded his review with the following, 
 
One of the defining characteristics of the mind-set of the recent boom was 
an irrational belief that stocks (as well as operating results and salaries and 
investment returns) could continue to go up indefinitely. This belief was 
often coupled with a conviction that we were personally responsible for 
this inexorable rise in value. Many of us arranged our business and 
personal affairs consistent with these delusional expectations and beliefs. 
When it all came crashing down, psychologists’ offices were filled with 
patients sure that the crash reflected some personal failure. 
 
For more than a decade, tens of millions of Americans lived with the confident 
understanding that money values represented real wealth. The collapse of the money values 
in the major U.S. securities markets obviously compelled the question: if this was real wealth, 
what happened to all of it? The participants, of course, were victims of a massive self-
delusion. The enormous enlargement of paper money values in the securities markets was 
without any connection at all to the production of real things: homes to live in, clothes to 
wear, schools that confer education, food for daily living, medical care when required, and 
machine tools that are required for the production of everything else. None of these were 
multiplied by the enormous enlargement of securities values. And the collapse had the main 
effect of concentrating, more than before, the money markers that continued to be respected 
as legitimate claims on goods and services. By 2002, the New York Times showed that 100 top 
telecom industry executives collectively made upwards of $6.2 billion dollars from sales of 
their firm’s securities – a number without linkage to any presumed “value” contributed by 
these executives.73 These sales represented part of a transfer of wealth from the majority of 
the population to the managerial elite. During the 1990’s, only the top 20 percent of the 
population increased its share of the nation’s income.74 
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